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ADDENDA 
A. Ruling on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. 
B. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-505(3). 
C. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-507(l)(a) 
D. Nash v. Clark, 75 P. 371 (Utah 1904) 
E. Order of Dismissal, entered June 9, 2017. (i) 
F. Black's Law Dictionary definition of "Person." 
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This Court has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78A-4-103(2)G) and a Pourover Order entered by the Utah Supreme Court on May 19, 
2017. The trial court entered its Ruling on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss on April 18, 
2017, attached as Addendum A. Appellant John Fenley ("Mr. Fenley") filed his Notice 
of Appeal on May 16, 2017. By letter dated June 12, 2017, the Court set a deadline of 
July 25, 2017 for the filing of the Appellant's Brief, which was subsequently extended by 
stipulation to August 24, 2017. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Issue 1: Whether the trial court erred when it dismissed Mr. Fenley's 
Complaint for failure to state a claim for relief, on the grounds that an individual 
may not acquire property by eminent domain as a matter of law . 
Standard of Review: Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, without 
deference to the decision of the trial court. In re Adoption of Baby B., 2012 UT 3 5, ,I 41, 
308 P. 3d 382 ("No deference is given to the lower court's analysis of abstract legal 
questions. This is because the lower court has no comparative advantage in resolving 
legal questions and settled appellate precedent is of crucial importance in establishing a 
clear, uniform body of law. Our review of conclusions of law is accordingly de novo. 
We take a fresh look at questions of law decided by a lower court, according no 
deference to its resolution of such issues."). 
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Preservation: This issue is preserved through the arguments presented by Mr. 
Fenley in his Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, filed April 10, 2017. (R.0092-0160, and 
especially R.0095.) 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-6-505(3), attached as Addendum B. 
"A person, other than a political subdivision of the state, that seeks to acquire 
property by eminent domain or that intends to use eminent domain to acquire property if 
the property cannot be acquired in a voluntary transaction shall ... [ and then listing 
preconditions to filing suit.]" 
Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-6-507(1)(a), attached as Addendum C. 
"The complaint shall contain: (a) the name of the corporation, association, 
commission or person in charge of the public use for which the property is sought, who 
must be styled plaintiff[.]" 
Nash v. Clark, 75 P. 371 (Utah 1904), affirmed on appeal in Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 
361 (1905) (affirming a judgment in favor of an individual who used the power of 





STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. 
Mr. Fenley filed the Complaint in this action on March 7, 2017, seeking to obtain 
through the power of eminent domain ownership and possession of certain real property 
along with any structures thereon (the "Property"). R. 0001-0002. Mr. Fenley also 
requested prejudgment relief in the form of an order permitting immediate occupancy, a 
temporary restraining order, and a preliminary injunction to prevent Appellant Provo City 
("Provo City") from destroying the building on the Property or from otherwise 
transferring ownership of the Property during the pendency of the proceedings. See R. 
0008 (Motion for Temporary Restraining Order); R. 0009 (Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction and Request for Hearing); R. 0010 (Motion for Immediate Occupancy); R. 
0010-0026 (Affidavit in Support of Immediate Occupancy Order); R. 0027 (Affidavit for 
Temporary Restraining Order). The trial court denied the request for a temporary 
restraining order on March 27, 2017. R. 0053. 1 
Thereafter, Provo City filed a Motion to Dismiss on April 3, 2017 (the "Motion to 
Dismiss"), arguing that the Complaint failed to state a claim for relief under Rule 
12(b )(6) both because Mr. Fenley advanced an impermissible use for the Property under 
the eminent domain statute, and that Mr. Fenley lacked standing to assert a claim for 
eminent domain. R. 0068-0081. 
1 Upon information and belief, Provo City has subsequently demolished the building in question. 
The effect, if any, of that action on this case should be addressed at the trial court upon remand. 
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Mr. Fenley filed an Opposition to Motion to Dismiss on April 10, 2017. R. 
0092-0160. As it pertains to this appeal, in that Opposition Mr. Fenley argued that: 
Nash v. Clark ( 1904) is a great example of a taking initiated by a person 
against their neighbor. No question of the right of an individual to exercise 
eminent domain was even brought up. The only question before the court 
in that matter was whether the intended taking could be considered a 
"public use." In the end, even though the taking was used directly only by 
the Plaintiff in that case, the use was deemed a public one because it 
advanced agendas that the state had decided were priorities. 
R.0095. Provo City then replied on April 17, 2017. R.0163-0167. 
The trial court granted the Motion to Dismiss on April 18, 2017. R. 0168-0170 
(Ruling on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss), attached as Addendum A. In that decision, 
the trial court characterized Mr. Fenley's complaint as "seeking a declaration of his right 
to eminent domain over property owned by Provo City," and then listed the requirements 
for a declaratory judgment action. Id. R. 0169. The trial court went on to hold that 
because Mr. Fenley "has not demonstrated that he has authority under the constitution, 
statute, rule, regulation or case law to exercise eminent domain as an individual," he 
therefore could not meet the requirement to show that there is a "justiciable controversy" 
or that "he has a legally protectible interest in the controversy." Id. R. 0169. In finding 
that Mr. Fenley lacked standing to pursue a declaratory judgment action, the trial court 
held that "[w]ithout a legal right to bring a claim for eminent domain, Fenley has no 
legally protectible interest in doing so." Id. R. 0169. It therefore dismissed the case with 
prejudice. See Order of Dismissal, entered June 9, 2017, R. 0218-0220, attached as 
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Addendum E; see also id. R. 0219 ("[Mr. Fenley] has failed to show authority under the 
Constitution, statute, rule, regulation, or any case permitting the exercise of eminent 
domain by an individual."). 
Mr. Fenley also filed several post-judgment motions which are not relevant to this 
appeal. 
Mr. Fenley now appeals. 
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
1. Mr. Fenley filed the Complaint in this action on March 7, 2017. R. 
0001-0002. 
2. Provo City filed a Motion to Dismiss on April 3, 2017. R. 0068-0081. 
3. Mr. Fenley filed an Opposition to Motion to Dismiss on April 10, 2017. R. 
0092-0160. 
4. Provo City replied on April 17, 2017. R.0163-0167. 
5. The trial court granted the Motion to Dismiss on April 18, 2017. R. 
0168-0170. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court is in error because it ruled that as a matter of law, an individual may 
not exercise the power of eminent domain under Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-6-501, et seq. 
To the contrary, the applicable statutes specifically state that "a person" may "seek[] to 
acquire property by eminent domain" if that person completes certain conditions 
9 
precedent and is using the property for an appropriate purpose. Utah Code Ann. § 
78B-6-505(3). Thus, the trial court was in error and the order granting the Motion to 
Dismiss should be reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. APPLICABLE LAW. 
On appeal, "[c]onclusions oflaw are accorded no particular deference and are 
reviewed for correctness." Kendall Ins., Inc. v. R & R Group, Inc., 2008 UT App 235, 1 
8, 189 P.3d 114. When interpreting a statute, "it is axiomatic that this court's primary 
goal 'is to give effect to the legislature's intent in light of the purpose that the statute was 
meant to achieve."' Monarrez v. Utah Dep 't of Transp., 2016 UT 10, 1 11, 3 68 P .3 d 846 
(quoting Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 23, 1159, 345 P.3d 566). The "best evidence of the 
legislature's intent is the plain language of the statute itself" and "[w]hen examining the 
statutory language, we assume the legislature used each term advisedly and in accordance 
with its ordinary meaning." State v. Miller, 2008 UT 61, 118, 193 P.3d 92 (citations and 
quotations omitted, alteration in original). Of course, the Court does not interpret the 
"plain meaning of a statutory term in isolation," but rather considers the "relevant context 
of the statute," with the goal of interpreting the "provisions in harmony with other 
statutes in the same chapter and related chapters." Monarrez, 2016 UT at 1 11 ( citations 
and quotations omitted). 
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II. THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE EMINENT DOMAIN STATUTE 
PERMITS PERSONS TO ACQUIRE PROPERTY THROUGH EMINENT 
DOMAIN. 
Nowhere in the eminent domain statute does it specifically list the types of 
plaintiffs that may bring a claim thereunder. Instead, the code first lists out the 
permissible uses of property sought to be obtained through the power of eminent domain. 
See Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-6-501 (titled "Uses for which right may be exercised"). 
Then, the code lists the types of "estates and rights in lands" which may be taken. See id. 
§ 78B-6-502. Then, it lists the types of private property which may be taken, including 
but not limited to "lands belonging to the state, or to any county, city or incorporated 
town, not appropriated to some public use." Id. § 78B-6-503(2). The statute then goes 
on to list some conditions precedent to the filing of a lawsuit to acquire property through 
eminent domain. Id. §§ 78B-6-504, 505. 
In Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-6-505, the statute lists certain conditions precedent 
applicable when a "political subdivision of the state" wishes to obtain property through 
an eminent domain action. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-505(1 ). Two subsections later, 
the statute lists different conditions precedent for when "[a) person, other than a political 
subdivision of the state," wishes to obtain property through an eminent domain action. 
Id. § 78B-6-505(3) (emphasis added). 
The statute makes other references to a "person" being able to bring a claim for 
eminent domain, as well. For example, in Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-6-507, which lists the 
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requirements for a complaint, the code states that "[t]he complaint shall contain ... 
the name of the corporation, association, commission or person in charge of the public 
use for which the property is sought, who must be styled plaintiffl.]" Utah Code Ann. § 
78B-6-507(1)(a) (emphasis added). In the provision concerning inspection of property 
subject to an eminent domain action, the code states that "[i]f land is required for public 
use, the person ... in charge of the use may survey and locate the property," and also 
permits that such a "person ... may, at reasonable times and upon reasonable notice, 
enter upon the land and make examinations, surveys, and maps of the land." Id. § 
78B-6-507(1), (2)(a). Later on, the code defines "condemnor" as "a person who acquires 
property by purchase from a condemnee under threat of condemnation." Id. § 
78B-6-520.3(1 )( d). 
Although the term "person" is not defined in the eminent domain statute, it strains 
credulity to think that the word would exclude an individual human being. Cf Kramer v. 
State Retirement Bd., 2008 UT App 351, ~ 14, 195 P.3d 925 ("Thus, while the term 
'person' is not defined in title 49, UAPA [Utah Administrative Procedures Act] defines 
this term as 'an individual, group of individuals, partnership, corporation, association, 
political subdivision or its units, governmental subdivision or its units, public or private 
organization or entity of any character, or another agency."' (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 
63G-4-103(1)(g))); see also Black's Law Dictionary at 1142-43 (Deluxe 6th ed. 1990) 
(defining "Person" as: "In the general usage, a human being (i.e. natural person), though 
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by statute term may include labor organizations, partnerships, associations, corporations, 
legal representatives, trustees, trustees in bankruptcy, or receivers."), attached hereto as 
AddendumF. 
The legislative intent of the above-cited references to a "person" having certain 
rights and obligations in connection with an action to condemn property under the 
eminent domain statute is clear: individuals may bring condemnation actions in their 
personal capacity. As such, the trial court made an error of law holding that an individual 
cannot bring an action under the eminent domain statute, and the ruling dismissing the 
case with prejudice should be reversed. 
III. THE UTAH SUPREME COURT HAS PERMITTED INDIVIDUALS TO 
PURSUE CONDEMNATION ACTIONS IN THE PAST. 
Nash v. Clark is an example of a Utah Supreme Court case in which an individual 
was permitted to obtain, through the power of eminent domain, a property interest in 
property owned by his neighbors, also private citizens. 7 5 P. 3 71 (Utah 1904 ), affirmed 
on appeal in Clarkv. Nash, 198 U.S. 361 (1905). In that case, "Plaintiff [Mr. E.J. Nash] 
brought this action to condemn a right of way in a ditch owned by the defendants," who 
were individuals Lee Clark, Robert Bennett, T.F. Carlisle, Lincoln Carlisle, and Richard 
Carlisle. Id. 371-72. Mr. Nash brought the action, relying upon a section of the eminent 
domain code existing at the time which stated: 
When any person or corporation desires to convey water for irrigation, or for 
any other beneficial purpose, and there is a canal or ditch already 
constructed that can be enlarged to convey the required quantity of water, 
then such person or corporation, or the owner or owners of the lands through 
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which a new canal or ditch would have to be constructed to convey the 
quantity of water necessary shall have the right to enlarge said canal or ditch 
already constructed by compensating the owner of the canal or ditch to be 
enlarged for the damage, if any, caused by said enlargement .... 
Id. at 372 (citing Section 1278 Rev. Stat. 1898). The appellants in that case contended 
that since Mr. Nash would be using the canal only to water his own property, that it was 
not an appropriate taking due the the purely private use. Id. at 373 ("Appellants contend 
that the order of the district court overruling the demurrer was erroneous for the reason 
that the complaint on its face shows that the use to be made of the property sought to be 
condemned is strictly private, and in no sense a public use."). The Utah Supreme Court 
rejected that argument, holding that irrigation of lands was a public use. Id. at 373-74. 
In reaching this conclusion, the Utah Supreme Court reviewed the "two lines of 
authorities" concerning what constituted a public use. Id. at 373. As explained by the 
Utah Supreme Court, the first line of authorities "holds that by public use is meant a use 
by the public or its agencies--that is, the public must have the right to the actual use in 
some way of the property appropriated[.]" Id. The second line "holds that it is a public 
use within the meaning of the law when the taking is for a use that will promote the 
public interest, and which use tends to develop the great natural resources of the 
commonwealth." Id. The Supreme Court ultimately held that: 
[T]he class of decisions last mentioned is more in harmony with 
enlightened public policy and that the liberal interpretation given the term 
"public use" which the Legislature has in effect, declared shall be followed 
in this State is far more conducive to individual and public advancement 
14 
Id. 
than the restricted construction adopted and followed by the line of 
decisions first referred to. 
The issue of whether Mr. Nash, as an individual, could exercise the power of 
eminent domain was not specifically addressed in the Nash decision; the question was 
whether his use constituted a public use. It is telling that the exercise of eminent domain 
by an individual was not even raised. Indeed, the statute in question used the term 
"person" in reference to the parties who may bring an eminent domain action, just like 
the language in today's statute. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the use of eminent domain by an individual was not 
specifically addressed, the Utah Supreme Court's decision to follow the second line of 
cases referenced above is consistent with the position advocated here by Mr. Fenley, and 
specifically: the eminent domain statute does not list or limit the ability to use that power 
to a particular set of plaintiffs. Rather, courts are to examine the use to which a plaintiff 
is intending for the property in dispute, and whether it is consistent with the liberal 
understanding of the term "public use" in eminent domain proceedings. See Utah Dep 't 
ofTransp. v. Coalt Inc., 2016 UT App 169, 117, 382 P.3d 602 ('"The phrase "public 
use," as used in the eminent domain statute, has been given a liberal interpretation by this 
court."' (quoting Town of Perry v. Thomas, 82 Utah 159, 22 P.2d 343, 346 (Utah 1933))). 
Admittedly, the public use in Nash, i.e., use of water, differs from the public use to 
which Mr. Fenley would put the Property. However, Mr. Fenley was deprived of the 
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opportunity to present his case for public use to the trial court because the trial court 
dismissed his complaint in error on the grounds that he, as an individual, may not 
exercise the power of eminent domain. Accordingly, the Court should reverse the 
decision of the trial court. 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court should reverse the trial court. 
DATED this 24th day of August, 2017. 
NONPROFIT LEGAL SERVICES OF UT AH 
Isl Aaron C. Garrett 
AARON C. GARRETT 
Attorneys for Appellant John Fenley 
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FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DEPARTMENT 
FILED 
APR 18 2017 
41:kl Ul1STRIC1 
:Sl"Altl. OF UTAH 
U'ID~ilf. COUNTY 
RULING ON DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 170400320 
Judge James Brady 
This matter comes before the court on Provo City's motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 
12(b) for failure to state a cause of action. Fenley opposes the motion to dismiss, believing his 
complaint states a legally cognizable claim for private condemnation of Provo City owned real 
property by Fenley so he can put it to a public use. Fenely alleges that eminent domain is an 
appropriate solution. The Court disagrees with Fenley's claim. Provo City's motion to dismiss is 
GRANTED for the reasons stated below. 
Rule 12(b)(6) URCivP allows for the filing of a motion to determine if the plaintiffs 
complaint fails to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted. In ruling on a motion 
to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court must construe the complaint in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff and indulge all reasonable inferences in his favor. Mounteer v Utah 
Power & Light Co., 823 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1991); and, Russell v Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 
262(Utah 1995). Also, a motion to dismiss is appropriate ... where it clearly appears that the 
plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under the facts alleged or under any set of facts they could 















John Fenley is an individual seeking a declaration of his right to eminent domain over 
property owned by Provo City. 
Standing to seek a declaratory judgment requires four elements: "(l) there must be 
a justiciable controversy; (2) the interests of the parties must be adverse; (3) the 
parties seeking relief must have a legally protectible interest in the controversy; 
and (4) the issues between the parties must be ripe for judicial determination." 
Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1148 (Utah 1983) (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted). The basic elements of the traditional test for standing are actual or 
potential injury, causation, and redressability. Brown v. Division of Water Rights 
of Dep't of Natural Res., 2010 UT 14, ,r,r 17-18, 228 P.3d 747. In the context of a 
quiet title action, this means that standing is "limited to parties who could acquire 
an interest in the property created by the court's judgment or decree." Holladay 
Towne Ctr., LLC v. Brown Family Holdings, LLC, 2011 UT 9, ,r,r 43, 54,248 P.3d 
452 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) . 
Kemp v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 2013 UT App 88, ,r 5, 301 P.3d 23, 24 
In response to Provo City's motion, Fenely has a duty to demonstrate that he has standing to seek 
a declaratory judgement. Fenley has failed to do so. He does not demonstrate that there is a 
justiciable controversy, and that he has a legally protectible interest in the controversy. 
Fenley claims his purpose is to put the property to a public use. However, he has not 
demonstrated that he has authority under the constitution, statute, rule, regulation or case law to 
exercise eminent domain as an individual. Based on the information provided by the parties the 
Court finds Fenley lacks standing to bring this action. Without a legal right to bring a claim for 
eminent domain, Fenley has no legally protectible interest in doing so. The Court finds Fenley 
lacks standing and grants Provo City's order to dismiss this case. 
April I 8, 2017 
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788-6-505 Negotiation and disclosure required before filing an eminent domain action. 
(1) A political subdivision of the state that seeks to acquire property by eminent domain or that 
intends to use eminent domain to acquire property if the property cannot be acquired in a 
voluntary transaction shall: 
(a) before the governing body, as defined in Subsection 788-6-504(2)(a), of the political 
subdivision takes a final vote to approve the filing of an eminent domain action, make a 
reasonable effort to negotiate with the property owner for the purchase of the property; and 
(b) except as provided in Subsection (4), as early in the negotiation process described in 
Subsection (1)(a) as practicable, but no later than 14 days before the day on which a final 
vote is taken to approve the filing of an eminent domain action: 
(i) provide the property owner a complete printed copy of the materials provided on the 
Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman website in accordance with Section 13-43-203 
regarding the acquisition of property for a public purpose and a property owner's right to just 
compensation; and 
(ii) provide the property owner a written statement in substantially the following form: 
"Although this letter is provided as part of an attempt to negotiate with you for the sale 
of your property or an interest in your property without using the power of eminent domain, 
[name of political subdivision] may use that power if it is not able to acquire the property 
by negotiation. Because of that potential, the person negotiating on behalf of the entity is 
required to provide the following disclosures to you. 
1. You are entitled to receive just compensation for your property. 
2. You are entitled to an opportunity to negotiate with [name of political subdivision] 
over the amount of just compensation before any legal action will be filed. 
a. You are entitled to an explanation of how the compensation offered for your 
property was calculated. 
b. If an appraiser is asked to value your property, you are entitled to accompany the 
appraiser during an inspection of the property. 
3. You are entitled to discuss this case with the attorneys at the Office of the Property 
Rights Ombudsman. The office may be reached at [provide the current contact information 
for the Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman]. 
4. The Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman is a neutral state office staffed 
by attorneys experienced in eminent domain. Their purpose is to assist citizens in 
understanding and protecting their property rights. You are entitled to ask questions and 
request an explanation of your legal options. 
5. If you have a dispute with [name of political subdivision] over the amount of 
just compensation due to you, you are entitled to request free mediation or arbitration of 
the dispute from the Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman. As part of mediation or 
arbitration, you are entitled to request a free independent valuation of the property. 
6. Oral representations or promises made during the negotiation process are not 
binding upon the entity seeking to acquire the property by eminent domain." 
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (4), the entity involved in the acquisition of property may not 
bring a legal action to acquire the property under this chapter until 30 days after the day on 
which the disclosure and materials required in Subsection (1 )(b)(ii) are provided to the property 
owner. 
(3) A person, other than a political subdivision of the state, that seeks to acquire property by 
eminent domain or that intends to use eminent domain to acquire property if the property 
cannot be acquired in a voluntary transaction shall: 
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(a) before filing an eminent domain action, make a reasonable effort to negotiate with the 
property owner for the purchase of the property; and 
(b) except as provided in Subsection (4), as early in the negotiation process described in 
Subsection (3)(a) as practicable, but no later than 30 days before the day on which the 
person files an eminent domain action: 
(i) provide the property owner a complete printed copy of the materials provided on the 
Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman website in accordance with Section 13-43-203 
regarding the acquisition of property for a public purpose and a property owner's right to just 
compensation; and 
(ii) provide the property owner a written statement in substantially the following form: 
"Although this letter is provided as part of an attempt to negotiate with you for the sale 
of your property or an interest in your property without using the power of eminent domain, 
[name of entity] may use that power if it is not able to acquire the property by negotiation. 
Because of that potential, the person negotiating on behalf of the entity is required to 
provide the following disclosures to you. 
1. You are entitled to receive just compensation for your property. 
2. You are entitled to an opportunity to negotiate with [name of entity] over the 
amount of just compensation before any legal action will be filed. 
a. You are entitled to an explanation of how the compensation offered for your 
property was calculated. 
b. If an appraiser is asked to value your property, you are entitled to accompany the 
appraiser during an inspection of the property. 
3. You are entitled to discuss this case with the attorneys at the Office of the Property 
Rights Ombudsman. The office may be reached at [provide the current contact information 
for the Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman]. 
4. The Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman is a neutral state office staffed 
by attorneys experienced in eminent domain. Their purpose is to assist citizens in 
understanding and protecting their property rights. You are entitled to ask questions and 
request an explanation of your legal options. 
5. If you have a dispute with [name of entity] over the amount of just compensation 
due to you, you are entitled to request free mediation or arbitration of the dispute from 
the Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman. As part of mediation or arbitration, you are 
entitled to request a free independent valuation of the property. 
6. Oral representations or promises made during the negotiation process are not 
binding upon the entity seeking to acquire the property by eminent domain." 
(4) The court may, upon a showing of exigent circumstances and for good cause, shorten the 14-
day period described in Subsection (1)(b) or the 30-day period described in Subsection (2) or 
(3)(b). 






788-6-507 Complaint -- Contents. 
(1) The complaint shall contain: 
(a) the name of the corporation, association, commission or person in charge of the public use for 
which the property is sought, who must be styled plaintiff; 
(b) the names of all owners and claimants of the property, if known, or a statement that they are 
unknown, who must be styled defendants; 
( c) a statement of the right of the plaintiff; 
(d) if a right of way is sought, its location, general route, beginning and ending, and be 
accompanied by a map of the proposed right of way, as it is involved in the action or 
proceeding; 
(e) if any interest in land is sought for a right of way or associated facilities for a subject activity 
as defined in Section 19-3-318: 
(i) the permission of the governor with the concurrence of the Legislature authorizing: 
(A) use of the site for the subject activity; and 
(B) use of the proposed route for the subject activity; and 
(ii) the proposed route as required by Subsection (1 )(d); and 
(f) a description of each piece of land sought to be taken, and whether it includes the whole or 
only part of an entire parcel or tract. 
(2) All parcels lying in the county and required for the same public use may be included in the 
same or separate proceedings, at the option of the plaintiff, but the court may consolidate or 
separate them to suit the convenience of parties. 
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E. J. NASH, Respondent, 
v. 
LEE L. CLARK, ROBERT N. BENNETT, T. F. 
CARLISLE, LINCOLN CARLISLE and RICHARD 
CARLISLE, Appellants 
No. 1406 
Supreme Court of Utah 
January 23, 1904 
Appeal from the Fourth District Court, Utah County.--Hon. 
J.E. Booth, Judge. 
Action to condemn a right of way in a ditch owned by the 
defendants. From ajudgment in favor of the plaintiff, the 
defendants appealed. 
AFFIRMED. 
J. W. N. Whitecotton, Esq., for appellants. 
other uses, or for irrigating purposes, or for draining and 
reclaiming lands, or for floating logs and lumber on streams 
not navigable. (6) Roads, railroads, tramways, tunnels, 
ditches, flumes, pipes, and dumping places to facilitate the 
milling, smelting, or other reduction of ores, or the working 
of mines; outlets, natural or otherwise, for the deposit or 
conduct of tailings, refuse, or water from mills, smelters or 
other works for the reduction of ores, or from mines; mill 
dams; ... also an occupancy in common by the owners or 
possessors of different mines, mills, smelters, or other 
places for the reduction of ores, of any place for the flow, 
deposit, or conduct of tailings or refuse matter . . .. (I 0) 
Canals, reservoirs, dams, ditches, flumes, aqueducts, and 
pipes for supplying and storing water for the operation of 
machinery for the purpose of generating and transmitting 
electricity for power, light, or heat." Section 1277, Rev. 
Stat. 1898, is as follows: "Any person or corporation shall 
have the right of way across and upon public, private, and 
corporate lands, or other right of way, for the construction, 
maintenance, repair, and use of all necessary reservoirs, 
dams, water-gates, canals, ditches, flumes, tunnels, or other 
means of securing, storing, and conveying water for 
irrigation, or for any necessary public use, or for drainage, 
upon payment of just compensation therefor, 
(27 Utah 160) but such right of way shall in all cases be 
exercised in a manner not to unnecessarily impair the 
practical use of any other right of way, highway, or public 
or private road, nor to unnecessarily injure any public or 
private property. Such right may be acquired in the manner 
provided by law for the taking of private property for public 
Messrs. Warner, Houtz, Prentiss & Warner for respondent. use." 
McCARTY, J., delivered the opinion of the court. 




[27 Utah 159] ST A TEMENT OF FACTS. 
Plaintiff brought this action to condemn a right of way in a 
ditch owned by the defendants. The provisions of the statute 
upon which he bases his right of action, so far as material to 
this case, are as follows: Rev. St. 1898, section 3588, in part 
provides: "Subject to the provisions of this chapter the right 
of eminent domain may be exercised in behalf of the 
following public uses: . . . (5) Reservoirs, dams, 
water-gates, canals, ditches, flumes, tunnels, aqueducts, and 
pipes for supplying persons, mines, mills, smelters, or other 
works for the reduction of ores, with water for domestic or 
Section 1278 provides: "When any person or corporation 
desires to convey water for irrigation, or for any other 
beneficial purpose, and there is a canal or ditch already 
constructed that can be enlarged to convey the required 
quantity of water, then such person or corporation, or the 
owner or owners of the lands through which a new canal or 
ditch would have to be constructed to convey the quantity 
of water necessary shall have the right to enlarge said canal 
or ditch already constructed by compensating the owner of 
the canal or ditch to be enlarged for the damage, if any, 
caused by said enlargement: provided, that said 
enlargement is to be done at any time from the first day of 
October to the first day of March, or at any other time that 
may be agreed upon with the owner of said canal or ditch." 
The complaint herein in substance alleges that plaintiff is 
the owner of 80 acres ofland situated in Utah county, this 
State, which land, without irrigation, is arid, barren, and 
unproductive, but with irrigation would produce in 
abundance, hay, grain, and other agricultural crops; that Ft. 
Canyon creek is a natural stream of water in Utah county, 
flowing from the mountains north of plaintiffs land in a 
southerly direction to and near plaintiffs land, that the 
defendants own a tract of land contiguous to and adjoining 
plaintiffs land on the north, and are also the owners of a 
certain ditch leading from Ft. Canyon creek over and across 
their land to a point within 100 feet of plaintiffs land, 
which ditch is a mile and a quarter in length, 18 inches 
wide, and 12 inches deep; that plaintiff owns water in Ft. 
Canyon creek sufficient to irrigate his land above 
mentioned; that there is no other convenient or practicable 
[27 Utah 161) way in which to divert the waters of said 
creek and convey the san1e onto plaintiffs land except by 
and through the ditch of defendants; that, in order to irrigate 
his land, it is necessary that plaintiff have a right of way 
through defendants' ditch; that for plaintiff to enter upon 
defendants' land to enlarge their ditch will not injure them; 
that plaintiff requested of defendants that they allow him to 
go onto their land and enlarge their ditch, and use it for 
conducting his water to and on his land, and offered to 
contribute his share of the expense of maintaining the ditch 
and all damages; that the defendants refused to permit him 
to do so. 
Plaintiff asks that he be permitted to enlarge defendants' 
ditch to the extent of widening it one foot more; that he 
have a perpetual right of way through said ditch when so 
widened, and constructed for the purpose of diverting and 
carrying his water from Ft. Canyon creek to his land for 
irrigation purposes; that the damages for such right of way 
and use of the ditch by plaintiff be fixed and determined, 
and that upon payment by the plaintiff of such damages he 
have such ditch condemned to the extent of and to the use 
and for the purposes above set forth, and that defendants be 
enjoined from in any way or manner asserting any right 
antagonistic 
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to this right of plaintiff; that, if plaintiff is permitted by 
decree of this court to enlarge and use the ditch as 
aforesaid, his land can be made productive and the use of 
the water to which plaintiff is entitled can and will be put to 
a beneficial and public use in the irrigation of plaintiffs said 
land, and for no other purpose. Defendants interposed a 
general demurrer to plaintiffs complaint, alleging that the 
complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a 
cause of action. The demurrer was overruled. The 
defendants elected to stand upon their demurrer, and the 
plaintiff introduced evidence in support of the allegations of 
his complaint, and the court entered judgment and decree in 
favor of plaintiff, condemning defendants' land as prayed 
for in the 
127 Utah 162) complaint; and for a reversal of this 
judgment the defendants have appealed to this court. 
McCARTY, J., after a statement of the foregoing facts, 
delivered the opinion of the court. 
Appellants contend that the order of the district court 
overruling the demurrer was erroneous for the reason that 
the complaint on its face shows that the use to be made of 
the property sought to be condemned is strictly private, and 
in no sense a public use. Both the Constitution of the United 
States and the Constitution of this State provide that 
"private property shall not be taken or damaged for public 
use without just compensation." This provision is construed 
to mean that private property can not be taken for strictly a 
private use, which counsel for respondent concede to be the 
true and proper construction. This brings us to the only 
question presented by this appeal, to-wit: Was the 
condemnation of appellants' land in this case in law and in 
fact for a public use? There is no fixed rule of law by which 
this question can be determined. In other words, what is a 
public use can not always be determined by the application 
of purely legal principles. This is evident from the fact that 
there are two lines of authorities, neither of which attempt 
to lay down any fixed rule as a guide to be followed in all 
cases. One class of authorities, in a general way, holds that 
by public use is meant a use by the public or its 
agencies--that is, the public must have the right to the actual 
use in some way of the property appropriated; whereas the 
other line of decisions holds that it is a public use within the 
meaning of the law when the taking is for a use that will 
promote the public interest, and which use tends to develop 
the great natural resources of the commonwealth. After a 
careful examination of the leading cases on this subject, we 
are of the opinion that the class of decisions last mentioned 
is more in harmony with enlightened public policy and that 
the liberal interpretation given the term "public 
127 Utah 163) use" which the Legislature has in effect, 
declared shall be followed in this State is far more 
conducive to individual and public advancement than the 
restricted construction adopted and followed by the line of 
decisions first referred to. 
The question of the manner of appropriation and use of 
water for domestic, irrigation, mining and manufacturing 
purposes is, and ever since the advent of the early pioneers 
has been, the most important and vital of all industrial 
questions with which the people within this arid region have 
been confronted. Their requirements, and, we might add, 
their absolute necessities, impelled the Legislatures and 
courts at an early date in the history of the States and 
Territories strictly arid in character to depart from and lay 
aside as impracticable some legal doctrines and rules 
relating to the control and use of water which had therefore 
been adhered to and followed for ages, and to adopt and put 
in operation a new system of acquiring title in and to the 
• 
• 
streams which are within the arid belt, the use of which was 
found to be indispensable in agricultural pursuits, in mining, 
in the establishment of industries, and in the general 
development of the arid States and Territories. By an 
examination of the records of the early cases in this State 
(then Territory) wherein the court declined to follow and be 
governed by the common-law doctrine or riparian rights in 
its entirety, the same arguments were advanced by those 
claiming title to water under and by virtue of this doctrine 
as arc advanced by appellants in this case, to-wit, that 
fundamental rights were being interfered with, and the 
property of one citizen was being taken and given to 
another. We very much doubt whether either advocate or 
layman, who has witnessed the magnificent results wrought 
by the change, would now contend that the Constitution 
was overridden, or any natural or legal right of the citizens 
invaded and their property confiscated, when the 
common-law doctrine of riparian rights was modified for 
the purposes of irrigation and mining, and a system for 
appropriating 
(27 Utah 164) and acquiring title to water adopted that 
made it possible for populous and flourishing common 
wealths to grow up where the country otherwise would have 
remained a desert, uninhabited, with the possible exception 
perhaps of an occasional cattle or sheep ranch. The question 
of how to increase the water supply in the arid region has 
steadily grown in magnitude and importance until it has 
become national as well as local. Congress realizing the 
great public necessity for an increased water supply, and 
appreciating the great possibilities that may be 
accomplished in this and other States and Territories within 
the arid belt by conserving and storing the high and surplus 
waters caused by the melting snows which in the spring 
months come down from the mountains in torrents, and are 
either wasted in the deserts or find their way into box 
canyons, where 
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they can never be made available for irrigation or other 
useful purposes, by a provision in the enabling act (section 
12) granted to this State 500,000 acres of public lands lying 
within the State, with which to create a fund to be used for 
the purpose of building reservoirs; and later on, by an act 
known as the "Irrigation Bill," created a fund from the 
public revenues, which is swelling into the millions of 
dollars, for the purpose of aiding in this most important of 
all enterprises of a public character in the arid west, and 
upon the success of which its future growth and prosperity 
largely depends. The large expenditure of public funds in 
this direction is not to be made for the purpose of enabling 
the States and Territories directly benefited thereby, in their 
sovereign capacity, to engage in farming and other lines of 
industry, which are dependent upon the water supply, but to 
ultimately enable the citizens, as individuals, to provide 
themselves with homes, and to furnish additional 
opportunities for the further development of the great 
natural resources with which the arid region abounds. These 
questions, which are the most important with which the arid 
States and Territories have had to deal, and the successive 
steps that have been taken in 
127 lltah 165) advancing our system of irrigation, are 
referred to for the purpose of showing the interest that the 
public have always had and must of necessity continue to 
have in the question of irrigation. The natural physical 
conditions of this State are such that in the great majority of 
cases the only possible way the farmer can supply his land 
with water is by conveying it by means of ditches across his 
neighbor's lands which intervene between his own and the 
source from which he obtains his supply. The question 
before us not only involves the right of the farmer to invoke 
the law of eminent domain, when necessary, to enable him 
to convey water to his farm, but that of the miner, 
manufacturer, and persons engaged in other industrial 
pursuits to build canals, flumes, and lay pipe lines over 
adjoining and intervening lands, when necessary for the 
purpose of conveying water necessary for the successful 
prosecution of their respective enterprises. The future 
growth, prosperity, upbuilding, and industrial expansion of 
the State not only depend upon the storing and holding back 
the high and surplus waters so they can be used in times of 
scarcity, but also in a careful and judicious husbandry of the 
supply now available; and it is entirely within the province 
of the Legislature to enact such laws respecting the 
appropriation and distribution thereof as will tend to 
prevent unnecessary loss and waste, so long as vested rights 
are upheld and maintained. Experience has shown that, the 
greater the amount of water flowing in a ditch of a given 
size and grade, the less the percentage of seepage and 
evaporation. Therefore, as a general rule, the owners of 
canals and ditches, instead of being damaged by their 
enlargement and the turning therein of an additional 
quantity of water, as is proposed in this case, will at least in 
times of scarcity during the hot summer months, and 
especially during the periods of protracted drouths, which 
have become so common of late years in this State, be 
benefited thereby, besides receiving the market value of the 
land condemned. In view of the physical and climatic 
(27 Utah 166) conditions in this State, and in the light of 
the history of the arid west, which shows the marvelous 
results accomplished by irrigation, to hold that the use of 
water for irrigation is not in any sense a public use, and 
thereby place it within the power of a few individuals to 
place insurmountable barriers in the way of the future 
welfare and prosperity of the State would be giving to the 
term "public use" altogether too strict and narrow an 
interpretation, and one we do not think is contemplated by 
the Constitution. 
The foregoing conclusions are supported by abundant 
authority. 10 Am. and Eng. Ency. of Law (2 Ed.), 1064, and 
cases cited. In the case of Dayton Mining Co. v. Seawell, 11 
Nev. 394, the plaintiff sought to condemn a right of way 
over certain lands to a mining claim owned by plaintiff, to 
be used for the purpose oftransporting wood, lumber, 
timbers, and other material to enable it to conduct and carry 
on its business of mining. The claim was made in that case, 
as it is in this that the statute under which the action was 
brought was unconstitutional for the same reasons as are 
urged in the case before us. Mr. Chief Justice Hawley, 
speaking for the court says: "That mining is the paramount 
interest of the State is not questioned. That anything which 
tends directly to encourage mineral developments and 
increase the mineral resources of the State is for the benefit 
of the public, and is calculated to advance the general 
welfare and prosperity of the people of this State, is a 
self-evident proposition. Hence, it necessarily follows that, 
if the position contended for by the petitioner is 
correct--and I believe it is--then the act is constitutional, 
and should be upheld. Although other and weaker reasons 
have been more frequently assigned, it seems to me that this 
is the true interpretation upon which courts have really 
acted in sustaining the right of eminent domain in favor of 
railroads and other objects, and in several of the decided 
cases this reason is expressly given .... Now, it happens, or 
at least is liable to happen, that individuals, by receiving the 
title 
(27 Utah 167) to barren lands adjacent to the mines, mills, 
or works, have it within their power, by unreasonably 
refusing to part with their lands for a just and fair 
compensation . . .. to greatly embarrass, if not entirely 
defeat, the business of mining in such localities. In my 
opinion, the mineral wealth of this State ought not to be left 
undeveloped for any quantity ofland actually necessary to 
enable the owner or owners of mines to conduct and carry 
on the business of mining. Nature has 
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denied to this State many of the advantages which other 
States possess, but by way of compensation to the citizens 
has placed at her doors the richest and most extensive silver 
deposits ever yet discovered. The present prosperity of the 
State is entirely due to the mining developments already 
made, and the entire people of the State are directly 
interested in having the future development unobstructed by 
the obstinate action of any individual or individuals. In the 
case of Oury v. Goodwin, 26 P. 376, practically the same 
question was involved as is presented here, and the 
Supreme Court of Arizona, in an elaborate and exhaustive 
opinion, in which many cases are cited and reviewed, held 
that the use of water for irrigation is a public use, and that 
an act of the Arizona Legislature, providing for the 
condemnation of lands for canal purposes, was 
constitutional. DeGraffenried v. Savage, 9 Colo. App. 131, 
4 7 P. 902; Yunker v. Nichols, I Colo. 551; Schilling v. 
Rominger, 4 Colo. 100. In the case of Fall brook Irr. Dist. v. 
Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 17 S.Ct. 56, 41 L.Ed. 369, the court, 
in the course of the opinion, says: "On the other hand, in a 
State like California, which confessedly embraces millions 
of acres of arid lands, an act of the Legislature providing for 
their irrigation might well be regarded as an act devoting 
the water to a public use, and therefore as a valid exercise 
of the legislative power .... To irrigate, and thus to bring 
into possible cultivation, these large masses of otherwise 
worthless lands, would seem to be a pub1ic purpose, and a 
matter of public interest, not confined to the landowners, 
[27 Utah 168) or even to any one section of the State. The 
fact that the use of the water is limited to the landowner is 
not therefore, a fatal objection to this legislation. In 
conclusion the court on this point further says: "We have no 
doubt that the irrigation of really arid lands is a public 
purpose, and the water thus used is put to a public use." 
Ellinghouse v. Taylor, 19 Mont. 462, 48 P. 757. There are 
many other well-considered cases which declare the same 
general doctrine as those referred to, but we deem it 
unnecessary to make further citations. 
The judgment of the district court is affirmed; the costs of 
this appeal to be taxed against the appellants. 
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ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Case No. 170400320 
Judge James Brady 
The Court, having considered the arguments of the parties as submitted in Defendant 
Provo City's Motion to Dismiss, and for good cause appearing, the Court now makes the 
following: 
Findings of Fact: 
Plaintiff John Fenley is an individual who seeks to exercise eminent domain over 
property owned by Defendant Provo City, purportedly for a public use. 
Conclusions of Law: 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure l 2(b )( 6) allows for the filing of a motion to determine if the 
plaintiffs complaint fails to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted. In 
ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the Court must construe the 
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complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and indulge all reasonable inferences 
in his favor. Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co., 823 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1991); Russel v. 
Standard Co,p., 898 P.2d 262 (Utah 1995). Also, "[a] motion to dismiss is appropriate .. 
. where it clearly appears that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under the facts 
alleged or under any set of facts they could prove to support their claim." Baker v. 
Angus, 910 P.2d 427,430 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
Fenley's Complaint seeks a declaratory judgment, but fails to meet the elements required. 
"Standing to seek a declaratory judgment requires four elements: "(I) there must be a 
justiciable controversy; (2) the interests of the parties must be adverse; (3) the parties 
seeking relief must have a legally protectible interest in the controversy; and (4) the 
issues between the parties must be ripe for judicial determination." Kemp v. Wells Fargo 
Bank, NA, 2013 UT App 88, ~ 5,301 P.3d 23. Fenley has failed to meet this standard. 
He has not demonstrated a justiciable controversy or a legally protectable interest in the 
controversy. He has failed to show authority under the Constitution, statute, rule, 
regulation, or any case permitting the exercise of eminent domain by an individual. 
Accordingly, Fenley lacks standing to bring this suit. 
Based on the foregoing, this case is ordered dismissed with prejudice. 
Approved as to form: 
2 
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John Fenley [Refused: objection on file] 
- - - - End of document (the date and Court's signature appear at the top of the first page) - - - -
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PER SALTUM 
beysh(iy)ow est/. It is in the nature of things that he 
who denies a fact is not bound to give proof. 
Per saltum / p~r s6lt~m/. Lat. By a leap or bound; by a 
sudden movement; passing over certain proceedings. 
Per sample /p~r sa:mp~I/. By sample. A purchase so 
made is a collateral engagement that the goods shall be 
of a particular quality. U.C.C. § 2-313(1)(c). 
Per sc / piir siy/'sey/. Lat. By itself; in itself; taken 
alone; by means of itself; through itself; inherently; in 
isolation; unconnected with other mut ters; simply as 
such; in its own nature without reference to its relation. 
In law of defamation, certain words and phrases that 
are actionable as slander or libel in and of themselves 
without proof of special damages, e.g. accusation of 
crime. Used in contrast to defamation per quod which 
requires proof of special damage. See Actionable per se; 
Libelous per se; Slanderous per se. 
See also Negligence per se: Per se doctrine; Per se 
violations. 
Pcr sccu tio /piirs~kyuwsh(iy)ow/. Lat. [n the civil law, 
a following after; a pursuing at law; a suit or prosecu-
Lion. Properly that kind of judicial proceeding before 
the prretor which was called "extraordinary." In a 
general sense, any judicial proceeding, including not 
only "actions" (actiones), properly so called, but other 
proceedings also. 
Per se doctr in e. Under the "per se doctrine." if an 
activity is blalant in its intent and pernicious in its 
effect, a court need not inquire into the reasonableness 
of the snme before determining that it is a violation of 
the antitrust laws. Connecticut Ass'n of Clinical Labor-
atories v. Connecticut Blue Cross, Inc., 31 Conn.Sup. 10, 
324 A.2d 288, 291. See Per se violations. 
Persequl / p~rs~kw::iy/. Lat. In the civi l law, to follow 
after; to pursue or claim in form of law. An action is 
called a "}us pcrsequendi." 
Per se violations. In anti-trust law, term that implies 
that certain types of business agreements, such as price-
fixing, are considered inherently anti-competitive and 
injurious to the public without nny need to determine if 
the agreement has actually injured market competition. 
See Per se doctrine; Rule (Rule of reason). 
Perl!on. In general usage, a human being (i.e. natural 
person), though by statute term may include labor orga-
nizations, partnerships, associations, corporations, legal 
representatives, trustees, trustees in bankruptcy, or re-
ceivers. See e.g. National Labor Relations Act. § 2(1), 
29 U.S.C.A. § 152; Uniform Partnership Act, § 2. 
Scope and delineation of term is necessary for deter-
mining those to whom Fourteenth Amendment of Con-
stitution affords protection since this Amendment ex-
pressly applies Lo "person." 
AlieM. Aliens are "persons" within meaning of Four-
teenth Amendment a nd a re thus protecte<l by equal 
protection clause against discriminatory state action. 
Foley v. Connelie, D.C.N.Y .. 419 F.Supp. 889, 891. 
;t:t{ 
Bankruptcy Code. "Person" includes inclivi.duifi.::( 
ncrship, and corporation, but not govcrnniiintar · 
11 U.S.CA. § 101. 
Commercial law. An iodividunl,t)r org~nizatioh . . \f. 
§ 1-201(30). _, .:iJ:Vii£ 
Corporation. A corporation is a "person" within'·& 
ing of Fourteenth Amendment equal protectiori'~ild; 
process provisions of United States Constitution:'M 
politan Life Ins. Co. V. Ward, Ala., 470 u.s/s's 
S.Ct. 1676, 1683, 84 L.Ed.2d 751. The term "persii 
statute relating to conspiracy to commit offe·n·s'e°:~-' 
United States, or to defraud United States, or'any 
cy, includes corporation. Alamo Fence Co. of I-iou~ 
U.S., C.A.Tex., 240 F.2d 179, 181. . . / i',(· 
• ·- i:'1:;··:-;.;;;_ 
In corporate law, "person" includes individ · 
entity. Rev.Model Bus.Corp.Act. § 1.40. . ';,, .,:·i\ 
Foreign government. Foreign govern~~n~·:.:·6t1W 
eligible to sue in U.S. courts are "persons!'. ciititf 
bring treble-damage suit for alleged antitrust' viola 
under Clayton Act, Section '1. Pfizer, Inc;_ ' ;;;;. al 
mcnt of India. C.A.Minn., 550 F.2d 39~.· . :,;/-///ffiJ. 
Illegitimate child. Illegitimate children · are' "pe --• 
within meaning of the Equal Protection Clii'ifsel' 
Fourteenth Amendment, Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U. 
88 S.Ct. 1509, 1511, 20 L.Ed.2d 436; and scope of'·., 
ful death statute, Jordan v. Delta Drilling eo·., ·wy-
P.2d 39, 48. , : :y; 
- . : .. =._.\ .. ·}$ ... 
l11teresled person. Includes heirs, devisees; ch· 
spouses, creditors, beneficiaries and any otherii ha~i' 
property right. in or claim against a trust estate'br, 
estate of a decedent, ward or protected perl50n''lr 
may be a ffected by the proceeding. It ais'o, rk 
persons having priority for appointment· ii'ii''p~· 
representative, and other fiduciaries represe'i'itfng 
ested persons. The meaning as it relates t.o''· , .. , 
persons may vary from time to time and must ~ 
mined according to t he particular purposes of/'i;; 
ter involved in, any proceeding. Uniform Proba .. 
§ 1- 201(20). ; . ::(;JW 
Labor unions. Labor unions are "persons" und 
Sherman Act and the Clayton Act, Case/ ·v.: 
C.A.Wash., 578 F.2d 793, 797, and a lso under k:· 
cy Code, Highway and City Freight Driver.;'. 't>~ 
and Helpers, Local Union No. 600 v. Gordon Tia' 
Inc., C.A.Mo., 576 F.2d 1285, 1287. . '>)/]_ 
Minors. Minors are "persons" under the Urifi.e 
Constitution, posses..sed of rights that govc·rnftic'r, 
respect. In re Scott K., 24 C.3d 395, 155 Cal.Rp 
674, 595 P.2cl 105. . , , :,/\(\ 
Municipalities. Municipalities and othet ·g:~:i{ 
units are ·•persons" within meaning of 42\ , 
§ 1983. Local government officials sued in the_i_~ .. , 
capacities arn "persons" for purposes of Sectio# 
those cases in which a local government would b . 
in its own name. Monell V . N. Y. City De]ia,, 
Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018;,. 
L.Ed.2d 611. See Color of law. .. ··-· 
·n of "person" or " persons" covered by anti-
\ncludes cities, whet.her as municipal utility 
·u~ as plaintiffs seeking damages for anti-
tions or as operators being sued as defendants. 
,iycU.e, La. v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 
. .S. 389, 98 S.Ct. 1123, 1128, 55 L.Ed.2d 364. 
~o~.-One for whom a conservator has been 
~r other pr9tective order has been made. 
Probate Code, .§ 5-103(18). 
i alie,;, A resident. alien is a "person" within 
' ing of the due process and equal protection 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. C. D. R. Entcr-
iui:-'v·. · Board of Ed. of City of New York, D.C. 
i2 i,.supp. 1164, 1168. 
~, child. Word "person" as used in the Four-
;.r{i~ndmenl does not include the unborn. Roe v. 
410 ·u.s. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 729, 35 L.Ed.2d 147. 
·"''
1
child is a "person" for purpose of remedies 
for personal injuries, and ch ild may sue after his 
·Weaks v. Mounter, 88 Nev. 118, 493 P.2d 1307, 
In some jurisdictions a viable fetus is considered 
n within the meaning of the state's wrongful 
statute, e.g. Summerfield v. Superior Court, 144 
67, 698 P.2d 712, and within the meaning of the 
vehicular homicide stat.ut.e, e.g. Comm. v. Cass, 
. . 799, 467 N.E.2<l 1324. See also Child; Children 
~ts of unbom child}, Unborn child; Viable child. 
rsity. A state university is a "person", within 
ing of § 1983. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Uberoi v. 
. ·ven;ity of Colorado, Colo., 713 P.2d 894, 900. 
·'~Jh'~ /~rsown~/ ·. Lat. ln the civil law, character in 
·.·u.e of _.which certain rights belong to a man and 
--~,, quties arc imposed upon him. Thus one man 
. ... _unite many characters (perso11.£), as, fo r example, 
(~acters of father and son, of muster and servant. 
7l.::O" '• 
it~11ble /p~rsan~bal/. Having the rights and powers 
person; able to hold or maintain a pica in court; 
·. ~p~city to take anything grant.ed or given. 
rt;'-'o'.~a conjuncta requipnratur interesse proprio 
~rs6.wna kanj:iokta ekwap.!re~r int~resiy prow-
,_rJy{Jw/. A personal connection [literally, a united per-
n, ;1!,IUon with a person] is equivalent t.o one's own 
~r_est; nearness of blood is as good a consideration as 
es_ own interest. 
': g~~ designate. / parsowna dezagneyt.;i/. A person 
_inted out or described as an individual, as opposed to 
_:person ascertained as a member of a class, or as fill ing 
·ll~it.i~ular character. 
·'rs~na ecclesire /pdrsown~ ,kliyziyiy/. The parson or 
.:}.J~.1.!~tion of the church. 
.. ~r~_~na est homo c um statu quodam considera tus 
/ p~rs6wnd est howmow k~m st,ctyuw kwowdam 
,,k,nsid~re~s/ . A person is a man considered with 
:ief!)rence to a cer_tnin status. 
.. ,e~<?.n aggrieved. To have standing as a "person ag-
,_,;· e_ved" under equal employment opportunities provi-
· 819µs of Civil Rights Act, or to assert rights under any 
'.Jederal regulatory statute, a plaintiff must show (1) that 
' -1>' 
PERSONAL EFFECTS 
he has actually suffered an injury, and (2) that the 
interest sought to be protected by the complainant is 
arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or 
regulated by the statute in question. Foust v. Trans-
america Corp., D.C.Cal., 391 F.Supp. 312, 314 . 
As contemplated by federal rule governing standing to 
object to alleged illegal search and seizure is one who is 
the victim of the search and seizure, as distinguished 
from one who claims prejudice only through the use of 
evidence gathered in a search directed at someone else. 
Cochron v. U.S., C.A.Colo., 389 F.2d 326, 327. 
Test of whether a petitioner is a "person aggrieved" 
and thereby entitled t.o seek review of an order of 
referee in bankruptcy is whet.her his property may be 
diminished, his burden increased or his rights detrimen-
tally affected by order sought to be reviewed. In re 
Capit.ano, D.C.La., 315 F.Supp. 105, 107, 108. 
See also Aggrieved party; Standing to sue doctrine. 
Personal. Appertaining lo the person; belonging to an 
individual; limited to the person; hav;ng the nature or 
partaking of the qualities of human beings, or of mova• 
ble property. ln re Sieimes' Estate, 150 Misc. 279, 270 
N.Y.S. 339. 
As to personal Action; Assets; Chattel; Contract; Cov-
enant; Credit; Demand; Disability; Franchise; Injury; 
Judgment; Knowledge; Liberty; Notice; Obligation; Prop-
erty; Replevin; Representative; Right; Security; Service; 
Servitude; Statute; Tax; Tithes; Tort; and Warranty, sec 
those t itles . 
Pe rsonal belongings. In probate law, term is u broad 
classification and in absence of restriction may include 
most or all of the testator's personal property. Goggans 
v. Simmons, Tex.Civ.App., 319 S.W.2d 442,445. See also 
Personal effects. 
Personal defenses. In commercial law, term usually 
refers t-0 defenses t hat cannot be asserted against a 
holder in due course in enforcing un instrument. Also 
refers to defenses of a principal debtor against o creditor 
that cannot be asserted derivatively by a surety. 
Personal effects. Articles associated with person, as 
property having more or less intimate relation to person 
of possessor; "effects" meaning movable or chat.tel prop-
erty of any kind. Usual reference is to such items as 
the following owned by a decedent at the time of death: 
clothing, furniture, jewelry, stamp and coin collections, 
silverware, china, crystal, cooking utensils, books, cars, 
televisions, radios, et.c. 
Term "personal effects" when employed in a will 
enjoys no settled technical meaning and, when used in 
its primary sense, without any qualifying words, ordi-
narily embrnces such tangible property as is worn or 
carried about the person, or tangible property having 
some intimate relation to the person of the testator or 
testatrix; where it is required by the context within 
which tho term appears, it may enjoy a broader mean-
ing. In re Stengel's Estate, Mo.App., 557 S.W.2d 255, 
260. 
